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Abstract
Private- and public-sector managers face a recurring organizational-design dilemma: the relative
emphasis to place on process-versus-outcome accountability in evaluating employee performance. This
chapter reviews experimental-psychological research that emphasizes the benefits of process
accountability and then notes blind spots in that literature, especially the insensitivity to the relational
signals that accountability manipulations convey about how evaluators view the evaluated. The chapter
also examines real-world ideologically-driven debates over accountability design in which partisans tend
to favor no-excuses forms of outcome accountability for those deemed untrustworthy and uncertaintybuffering forms of process accountability for the trustworthy. Finally, an integrative framework is
proposed that examines how managers can balance the inevitable tradeoffs between decision-making
control enhanced under process accountability and innovation fostered under outcome accountability,
and sheds light on how agent empowerment can compensate for the deficiencies of both systems.
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Abstract and Keywords
Private- and public-sector managers face a recurring organizational-design dilemma: the
relative emphasis to place on process-versus-outcome accountability in evaluating
employee performance. This chapter reviews experimental-psychological research that
emphasizes the benefits of process accountability and then notes blind spots in that
literature, especially the insensitivity to the relational signals that accountability
manipulations convey about how evaluators view the evaluated. The chapter also
examines real-world ideologically-driven debates over accountability design in which
partisans tend to favor no-excuses forms of outcome accountability for those deemed
untrustworthy and uncertainty-buffering forms of process accountability for the
trustworthy. Finally, an integrative framework is proposed that examines how managers
can balance the inevitable tradeoffs between decision-making control enhanced under
process accountability and innovation fostered under outcome accountability, and sheds
light on how agent empowerment can compensate for the deficiencies of both systems.
Keywords: accountability, process, outcome, ideology, empowerment, trustworthiness

Introduction
As this handbook attests, accountability is a multifaceted phenomenon that can be
studied from a wide range of theoretical and methodological perspectives. This chapter
grapples with a problem that has largely fallen between the disciplinary cracks: the
choice that both private- and public-sector managers often face between oversight
systems that focus on holding others accountable either for their efforts to achieve
outcomes (with minimal regard for the accuracy or quality of those outcomes—pure
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process accountability) or for their effectiveness in actually delivering outcomes (with
minimal regard for the processes utilized to arrive at these outcomes—pure outcome
accountability) (Beach and Mitchell 1978; Curley, Yates, and Abrams 1986). Of course, the
choice need not be dichotomous. Most accountability systems are evolving processoutcome hybrids that lean in one direction or another but that, depending on task and
context, assign shifting weights to process-oriented versus outcome-oriented standards
for judging performance (Eisenhardt 1985; 1989; Tetlock and Mellers 2011b).
Although one might suppose designing process or outcome accountability systems to be a
dry, technocratic affair of “principals” crafting optimal incentives for “agents” who have
varying degrees of risk aversion, debates between proponents of process-oriented vs.
outcome-oriented systems have proven surprisingly spirited and even occasionally
acrimonious, breaking out in diverse organizational domains, including intelligence
analysis (Tetlock and Mellers 2011a), public schools (Chubb and Moe 1988), equal
employment opportunity (EEO) enforcement (Tetlock, Vieider, Patil, and Grant 2013),
(p. 70)

auditing (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, Peytcheva, and Wright 2011), investment

strategies (Sutcliffe and McNamara 2001), sales-force management (Anderson and Oliver
1987; Cravens, Ingram, LaForge, and Young 1993), health care (Rubin, Pronovost, and
Diette 2001), information systems development (Kirsch 1996), human resource systems
(Arthur 1994), product manufacturing (Hammer and Stanton 1999), and business
innovation (Coyne 1997; Simons 2005). Proponents of process accountability often argue
that it is prudent to incentivize the adoption of best practices (processes) that employees
can control—and, that it is both inefficient and unfair to hold subordinates responsible for
outcomes beyond their control (a policy that merely rewards the lucky and punishes the
unlucky (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001)). By contrast, proponents of outcome
accountability often counter that it is essential to pressure employees to find new
ingenious ways of bringing “uncontrollable” outcomes under control (Simons 2005). In
this view, process accountability can too easily degenerate into bureaucratic rituals in
which employees adhere to widely-accepted processes within the organization and make
excuses for poor outcomes by claiming that they did all they could within the bounds of
organizational norms and “best practices” (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Tetlock and Mellers
2011b; Wilson 1989).
The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to exploring the actual and perceived
consequences of process and outcome accountability—and is divided into three sections.
First, we summarize the experimental literature on the actual pros and cons of process
versus outcome accountability with respect to judgment and choice dependent variables
—a literature that stresses the advantages of process accountability but that has serious
methodological limitations. Second, we examine some real-world political debates that
have arisen over the pros and cons of process versus outcome accountability—a body of
work that highlights the perceived strengths and weaknesses of each type of
accountability among observers of varying ideological persuasions but that sheds less
light on actual strengths and weaknesses. Third, we propose a conceptual framework that

Page 2 of 26

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

Process Versus Outcome Accountability

generates novel hypotheses about the conditions under which process and outcome forms
of accountability are likely to improve or degrade the quality of judgment and choice and
that offers guidelines for practitioners about how to achieve the best of both
accountability worlds.

The Laboratory Literature on Process versus
Outcome Accountability
Experimental research on process versus outcome accountability tends to emphasize the
relative benefits of process accountability (Lerner and Tetlock 1999). For example,
studies have shown that process accountability reduces escalating commitment to sunk
costs (Simonson and Staw 1992), produces better-calibrated probability judgments
(Siegel-Jacobs and Yates 1996), enhances performance on tasks requiring analytical
(p. 71)

processing (Langhe, Osselaer, and Wierenga 2011), enriches attentiveness and

alertness in making judgments (Brtek and Motowidlo 2002), and motivates more
thorough information search and analysis (Doney and Armstrong 1996).
Experimental psychologists have advanced a number of reasons why, relative to outcome
accountability, process accountability often yields more empirically accurate and logically
defensible judgments. For instance, they have proposed that outcome accountability
pushes decision-makers’ stress levels into a super-optimal zone that rigidifies cognition,
whereas process accountability mitigates evaluation apprehension by reassuring
decision-makers that they will be “socially safe” as long as they deploy defensible
procedures (Siegel-Jacobs and Yates 1996). This reassurance is especially important for
decision-makers who believe they live in a world of irreducible uncertainty (Hammond
1995).
Experimental psychologists have also suggested that process accountability, by
encouraging more thorough evaluation of available information (Brtek and Motowidlo
2002; Dreu, Koole, and Steinel 2000; Ford and Weldon 1981; Tetlock 1983; Tetlock and
Boettger 1989) focuses decision-makers’ attention on “how” to make sound decisions
(Siegel-Jacobs and Yates 1996). Outcome accountability, by contrast, merely conveys to
the decision-maker that judgments need to be accurate without providing guidance on
how to achieve this goal. This argument is also advanced in debates about how best to
improve health care quality (a sector where outcomes are often beyond the provider’s
control). Process, as opposed to outcome, measures provide information that is actionable
—i.e., they identify for clinicians which processes have the potential to affect patient
outcomes—and thus can be used to provide feedback for quality improvement (Rubin et
al. 2001).
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Outcome accountability, however, is not without its advocates. For example, Langhe et al.
(2011) demonstrate that the benefits of process accountability accrue only for tasks with
certain characteristics. They found that although outcome accountability decreased
performance on simple tasks that required analytical processing, it increased
performance on configural tasks that required more holistic processing. Studies have also
found that pressures to justify procedures can lead people under process accountability
to shift decision-making weights rapidly, causing them to fall prey to the decoy effect and
to adopt narrower decision-making strategies (Slaughter, Bagger, and Li 2006). Lastly,
Arkes, Dawes, and Christensen (1986) found that when held accountable for the accuracy
of their judgments, decision makers were less likely to base their judgments on linear
additive rules that the experimenters explicitly conveyed to them to complete the
probabilistic task, instead setting out to find more optimal outcomes beyond what
decision process norms allowed. This suggests that outcome accountability can
sometimes motivate decision makers to seek novel and ingenious strategies that
compensate for inadequate established procedures, in order to optimize desired
outcomes (Simons 2005; Tetlock and Mellers 2011b).
However, the experimental work reviewed here suffers from at least two major
methodological limitations which call into question its applicability to actual
organizations. The first concerns the mismatch between experimental manipulations of
(p. 72)

process accountability and real-world forms of process accountability. Institutional

theorists have long noted that decision makers in social systems are typically constrained
by normative guidelines when they select judgment and choice strategies (Edelman 1985;
Feldman and March 1981; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Pfeffer 1981). To meet societal
demands for rationality and fairness, organizations often adopt formal processes and
rules for gathering, storing, communicating, and using information (Feldman and March
1981). These rules are deeply embedded within the institutions’ symbolic systems,
relational systems, routines, and artifacts (Scott 2008) and passed on to newcomers
during organizational socialization (Maanen and Schein 1979).
However, the vast majority of laboratory experiments reviewed above have tended to
create unusual (deliberately normatively ambiguous) forms of process accountability in
which participants are unaware of what their evaluators deem to be “effective” or
“quality” procedures for making judgments and decisions (Ashton 1992; Brtek and
Motowidlo 2002; Dreu et al. 2000; Slaughter et al. 2006). By contrast, decision makers
under outcome accountability are often told that their performance evaluations will be
based on comparison of their responses to predictions derived from statistical models
(Arkes et al. 1986; Langhe et al. 2011; Siegel-Jacobs and Yates 1996), or to the judgments
of fictitious subject matter experts (Brtek and Motowidlo 2002; Slaughter et al. 2006), or
to judgments of team members (Klimoski 1972), or based on the reactions of recipients of
the decisions (Adelberg and Batson 1978; Fandt and Ferris 1990). In brief, the normative
standards governing what constitutes a high quality decision were often known to the
decision maker.
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The benefits of process accountability in the lab then are not wholly surprising. Most
research demonstrates that under normative ambiguity, people select the most broadly
defensible decision strategies possible, which in turn, leads to more systematic, evenhanded, and integratively complex thinking (Tetlock 1983; Tetlock, Skitka, and Boettger
1989). However, process accountability in organizations with well-defined norms about
what constitutes “quality” procedures could potentially degrade quality of judgment and
choice if it simply encourages decision makers to rely on the acceptability heuristic to
convince influential constituencies that their processes are rational and that they are
reasonably intelligent (Pfeffer 1981; Schlenker 1980; Tedeschi 1981)—after all, utilizing
widely accepted beliefs of what is deemed “intelligent” often serves to assure managers
that due care was taken to make rational decisions (Langley 1989). As such, conformity to
inadequate or defective practices can be a potential consequence of heavy-handed types
of process accountability.
The second limitation concerns the extent to which experimental manipulations of
process and outcome accountability convey socio-relational signals to the decision maker.
The imposition of accountability systems often places the decision maker in a de facto
subordinate relationship by defining to whom he or she is accountable and the normative
grounds under which evaluations will be made (Tetlock 1985). Situated-identity theory
and related frameworks suggest that people in any interpersonal interaction are in a
continuous process of negotiating identities vis-à-vis each other, often alternating rapidly
between the roles of claiming identities for themselves (e.g., trustworthy,

(p. 73)

competent, likable) and granting, to varying degrees, the identity claims of others
(Tetlock 1984). In principle, everything people do can be scaled for its identity
implications—if I do x or y, what conclusions will others draw about my character? Given
that this other party has acted in x or y fashion toward me, what message does that send
about the types of situated identities that they are prepared to grant me in this situation?
These micro-signals can have major effects on the cognitive, emotional, or behavioral
responses of agents to accountability demands. An ongoing meta-analysis of the
accountability literature by Vieider and Tetlock (2011) sheds light on the various microsignals that can be conveyed between principal and agent and the sensitivity of these
signals to minimal changes in context or messaging. A shift in one or two words can
reframe accountability from polite request to categorical demand (from “we ask that you
explain how you reached your conclusions...” to “you will be required to explain how you
reached your conclusions...”) and from an inquisitorial-prosecutorial tone to a friendly
expression-of-curiosity tone (from “justify/defend your views” to “help us to understand
why you see things as you do”). A shift in one or two words can also change from whom
people believe the request or demand has sprung; an audience more likely to be
sympathetic (e.g., members of one’s team or in-group) or intelligently skeptical (e.g.,
neutral experts) or hostile (e.g., members of a rival team or out-group); an audience
comprised of lower-, same-, or higher-status persons (e.g., fellow students or doctoral
fellows); an audience whose goal is simply judging you (e.g., someone “grading” your
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responses) versus one whose goal is getting to know you and treating you with respect as
someone who has a capacity to contribute to the investigation (e.g., someone who is
genuinely curious about your views).
Although the effects of various micro-signals on decision-making remain to be fully
investigated, it is quite plausible that previous studies have conveyed more positive
relational signals to those under process accountability than to those under outcome
accountability. For example, in most process accountability manipulations, participants
were informed that an interview would be conducted where they would be asked about
the processes they utilized to make their decisions, potentially conveying a sense of
acceptance of the subjects as important and valuable contributors to the experiment
(Arkes, Christensen, Lai and Blumer 1987; Ashton 1992; Brtek and Motowidlo 2002; Dreu,
Beersma, Stroebe, and Euwema 2006; Dreu et al. 2000; Langhe et al. 2011; Ford and
Weldon 1981; Hagafors and Brehmer 1983; McAllister, Mitchell, and Beach 1979; Rozelle
and Baxter 1981; Siegel-Jacobs and Yates 1996; Simonson and Nye 1992; Simonson and
Staw 1992; Tetlock and Boettger 1989; Tetlock and Kim 1987). For the outcome
accountability manipulations, the opportunity to justify one’s outcomes face-to-face varied
across studies, and quite likely signaled a lack of respect and regard for the
competencies, abilities, and contributions of the subjects. The studies that did allow for
an interview were only conducted so the participants could explain why they succeeded
or failed in reaching optimal outcomes (Adelberg and Batson 1978; Brtek and Motowidlo
2002; Fandt and Ferris 1990; Klimoski 1972; Simonson and Staw 1992). In other cases,
there was no face-to-face interaction with the interviewer, and decision makers only
received monetary bonuses for reaching optimal outcomes (Arkes et al. 1986; Langhe
(p. 74)

et al. 2011; Siegel-Jacobs and Yates 1996; Slaughter et al. 2006). If this analysis of

the relational signals in each accountability condition is accurate, it suggests another
possible explanation for the cognitive benefits of process accountability.
There is no inherent reason, however, why process and outcome accountability must
always be linked respectively to positive and negative relational signals. For instance, it is
easy to imagine forms of process accountability that convey to participants a lack of
respect for the competencies of the decision maker—e.g., they are being held accountable
for processes because the evaluators lack the confidence in their ability to choose sound
processes on their own and want to ensure that they are adopting agreed-upon strategies
to achieve desired objectives (Jaworski 1988; Merchant 1988). Here we should expect the
effects of process accountability to be less beneficial. Substantial bodies of work in social
psychology and organizational behavior demonstrate that people react negatively to
institutional control systems that depict them as lazy and incompetent (Enzle and
Anderson 1993; Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis 2007; Sutton and Galunic 1996). For
example, instituting close-knit monitoring systems that signal lack of trust has been
shown to lead experimental agents to become less creative (Amabile 1979), less
trustworthy (Malhotra and Murnighan 2002), and less willing to engage in organizational
citizenship behavior crucial for the effective function of most collectivities (Organ 1988).
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Because of the lack of consideration of normative structures and relational microsignaling in laboratory research on process and outcome accountability, it is difficult to
generalize these studies to supplement a broader understanding of these accountability
systems as they operate in organizational life. As an alternative, we now turn our
attention to real-world debates about these accountability systems in the realm of public
policy.

Real-World Debates about the Pros and Cons of
Process versus Outcome Accountability
Debates over the merits of process vs. outcome accountability have popped up in a
variety of policy arenas. Here we focus on three spheres: disputes over the criteria for
evaluating teacher performance in public schools, for evaluating the equal employment
opportunity (EEO) performance of personnel managers, and for evaluating the accuracy
of national intelligence estimates generated by intelligence analysts.
The same underlying question about normative ground rules recurs across domains. To
what extent should people be responsible for how they do their jobs (trying hard to
achieve organizational goals using best known practices) and secondarily for what they
actually accomplish, versus responsible for what they accomplish and secondarily for how
they manage to do it? Proponents of pure-process accountability favor

(p. 75)

the former

—enforcing EEO norms on the basis of how carefully managers ensure that personnel
decisions are grounded in job-relevant performance data, not on statistical quotas
specifying the target representation of minorities across jobs; judging teachers on their
teaching performance (e.g., lesson plans, clarity of delivery), not on student test scores;
and judging intelligence analysts on how rigorously they assess available evidence, not on
whether they get it right or wrong. By contrast, proponents of pure-outcome
accountability favor the latter, shifting focus from evaluating inputs to evaluating
outcomes—evaluating managerial efforts to create an EEO workplace by the actual
minority numbers in the firm; evaluating teacher performance by student test scores; and
evaluating intelligence analysts’ efforts by actual predictive track records.
In a correlational field study, Tetlock et al. (2013) found a rather strong connection
between support for outcome accountability and suspicions about agent trustworthiness,
or perceptions of how likely these agents are to be “opportunistic” when no one is
looking. Managers often tacitly assume that outcome accountability is harder to game
than is process accountability—and therefore more appropriate for less conscientious or
honest agents. Process accountability is seen as too vulnerable to the critique of
“cosmetic compliance” in which skeptics worry that it is too easy to fake inputs: for
personnel officers in corporations to pretend to be in compliance with equal-employmentopportunity rules even though they are not and minority advancement is languishing; or
for public school administrators to pretend to implement best educational practices even
Page 7 of 26
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though they are not and student achievement test scores are languishing; or for
intelligence analysts to pretend to be in compliance with rigorous epistemic norms for
processing evidence even though they are not and serious errors are creeping into
national intelligence estimates. Political observers may offer kinder, gentler forms of
process accountability only to those agents whom they classify as trustworthy.
Consistent with this reasoning, Tetlock et al. (2013) found a strong ideology- byinstitutional-domain interaction. In early twenty-first-century America, liberal managers
tended to be more skeptical of private-sector corporations and more tolerant of publicsector employees and their unions whereas conservatives tended to have the mirrorimage orientation. As such, American liberals were more likely to prefer low-tolerancefor-excuses, outcome accountability for personnel decision-makers charged with
implementing equal employment opportunity laws in private sector organizations,
whereas American conservatives were more likely to prefer strict outcome accountability
for public school teachers and their unions.
Tetlock et al. (2013) also examined the extent to which liberals and conservatives would
alter their accountability-regime preferences in response to evidence. They found that
ideologically motivated observers often find ingenious ways of preserving their
preconceptions about agent trustworthiness. For example, participants were informed
that teachers have responded to an outcome accountability system by finding sneaky
ways of adjusting test scores. The dominant reaction of liberals was that, although this
was deplorable, the outcome-accountability system drove teachers to this desperate
measure

(p. 76)

(thereby protecting the perception of teachers as fundamentally

trustworthy, albeit corruptible by a flawed system). Liberals thus preferred shifting from
an outcome to a process accountability system. The dominant reaction of conservatives
was that the cheating reinforced their view of the public school system—and of the need
for more rigorous outcome accountability.
The flipside pattern arose when liberals and conservatives learned that corporate
personnel managers had responded to an outcome accountability system mandating
numerical goals for minority advancement by finding sneaky ways of playing the
numbers. Now the dominant reaction of conservatives was that, although this was
deplorable, the perverse outcome-accountability system drove managers to this extreme
(again, thereby protecting the perceived trustworthiness of the agents who had been
corrupted by a flawed accountability system). By contrast, liberals saw the pattern of
cheating as reinforcing their view of continuing racial bias among managers—and their
view of the need for even more rigorous outcome accountability.
These ideologically driven debates over accountability systems tell us quite a bit about
the power of motivated reasoning in managerial judgments about how to design
accountability systems. All too often, managers appear to be prisoners of their
accountability preconceptions. Unfortunately, however, these debates tell us little about
the actual effectiveness of process versus outcome accountability.
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An Integrative Framework: Accountability and
Empowerment
In this section, we attempt to correct for the limitations of both previous laboratory work
on accountability and correlational field studies of debates over accountability design. We
propose an integrative framework for exploring the impact of process and outcome
accountability grounded in the classic tension between exploitation and exploration in
organizational learning (Levitt and March 1988; March 1991): the tension between
extracting maximum utility from established routines (by encouraging process
compliance with best practices, often by reducing discretion by relying on statistical
models) and the need to encourage agents to think outside the proverbial box (by
identifying shortcomings in standard processes and innovating). We shall also argue that
the effects of process and outcome accountability hinge less on the process–outcome
distinction than they do on the social-identity signals that accountability sends to
employees about how managers view them—and the resulting impact on psychological
empowerment. Those forms of process and outcome accountability that “empower”
employees are more likely to stimulate innovation whereas those that “disempower”
employees are more likely to yield perfunctory compliance (if not passive or active
resistance).
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(p. 77)

The Challenge of Balancing Control and Innovation

Organizations are often under pressure—from both regulators and competitors—to
standardize decision practices to conform to best practice guidelines of one form or
another (Sutcliffe and McNamara 2001). This trend is evident in many settings, including
intelligence analysis, risk analysis of financial products, tax compliance, patient medical
care, product manufacturing companies, and human resources (e.g., termination, layoff,
and hiring processes). By formalizing decision processes, organizations can both
communicate regulatory compliance and exploit existing knowledge routines for
enhancing reliability (Dean and Sharfman 1993; Hackman and Wageman 1995). Research
on organizational politics suggests that control over process is a key source of power
(Crozier 1964; Pettigrew 1973), and given the information asymmetries about how things
really work that often favor employees over management, implementing formal
procedures is one means by which management can reduce its disadvantage and gain
control over its agents (Eisenhardt 1985; Fama and Jensen 1986).
Of course, there is always the risk that best practices will ossify into bureaucratic
ritualism and persist long after a changing world has made them obsolete. Such
stagnation is often explained by a mix of organizational processes. For instance,
organizational socialization, the process by which one learns “the ropes” of particular
roles, fosters the internalization of standard practices among newcomers and shapes
their perspectives for interpreting new information (Maanen and Schein 1979). These
practices gradually become taken for granted as “the way things are done” (Berger and
Luckmann 1966)—and eventually become automated and unfold unconsciously (DiMaggio
and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977). This automation can result in rigidities or
organizational inertia (Mintzberg 1978; Starbuck 1983; Tushman and Romanelli 1985).
The net result is that managers confront trade-offs between control and innovation. They
want to encourage process compliance but also to encourage creative workarounds for
processes that have outlived their usefulness. This trade-off is a recurring refrain in
management theory (Detert, Schroeder, and Mauriel 2000; Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995;
Levinthal and March 1993; Shea and Howell 1998; Sitkin, Sutcliffe, and Schroeder 1994).

Linking Process and Outcome Accountability to Balancing Control
and Innovation
Accountability can shape how decision makers perform this balancing act. Two theories
in social psychology—construal level theory (Liberman and Trope 1998; 2003) and
regulatory focus theory (Higgins 1997; 1998)—imply that process accountability is more
conducive to achieving goals of control and outcome accountability is more conducive to
innovation. Pure process accountability directs attention toward the “means” of the
judgment task, rather than the “end” of accuracy, in order to meet evaluation demands.
As a result, agents adopt low-level, concrete interpretations of their tasks and a
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prevention-focused emphasis on duties, obligations, and compliance (Liberman, Idson,
(p. 78)

Camacho, and Higgins 1999). The resulting mindset enables detailed attention to

control how one makes up one’s mind whereas the resulting prevention-focused
motivation enables compliance with standard decision practices of the organization.
By contrast, pure outcome accountability tends to direct attention toward ends rather
than means—an end-state focus that facilitates high-level, abstract mental interpretations
of tasks and motivates promotion-focused coping that includes proactive informationsearching, risk-taking, and openness to change (Liberman, Molden, Idson, and Higgins
2001). This high-level processing also facilitates novel thinking because it renders
common associations, which impede innovation, less accessible (Friedman, Fishbach,
Förster, and Werth 2003; Friedman and Förster 2001). This, coupled with promotionfocused motivation, enables agents to think beyond standard practices and to experiment
with new methods of achieving better outcomes (Arkes et al. 1986).
The relationship between process and outcome accountability and the actual achievement
of control and innovation goals is however inevitably precarious, because both systems
have the potential to backfire. We can deduce this precariousness from construal-level
theory itself, which posits that activation of abstract (concrete) construal levels
automatically deactivates concrete (abstract) construal levels (Trope and Liberman
2010). In this view, low-level or concrete construals induced by process accountability
must subtract attention from the high-level or abstract attributes of the judgment task.
This “getting lost in the trees” phenomenon can cause agents to stick with standard
practices with little to no recognition of their shortcomings in achieving outcomes. The
control that an organization tries to achieve through process accountability can thus
spiral downward into blind conformity that sustains deficient decision practices.
Conversely, high-level construals induced by outcome accountability necessarily subtract
attention from how judgments are made. Under outcome accountability, decision-making
increasingly relies on “intuitive” means or what feels “right” in the race to achieve
optimal judgments (Brtek and Motowidlo 2002). This can be detrimental for organizations
as innovation not only requires discovering more effective practices but also crossvalidation testing and codification of the new practices so they can be implemented
elsewhere in the organization. Standard practices are supposed to prescribe effective
strategies—and this is thwarted if these processes are never incorporated into collective
memory (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 1999).
Organizational theories also lend support to this analysis of process and outcome
accountability. As noted before, pressures to adopt “sound” processes under process
accountability can cause people to seek out the most easily defensible procedures—as
standard practices offer political cover that allows agents to claim competence,
rationality, and legitimacy, with minimal risk of pushback (Langley 1989; Pfeffer 1981;
Schlenker 1980; Tedeschi 1981). After all, these practices represent “how we do things
here,” offering political cover to agents seeking to assure evaluators that due diligence
was exercised. Coping reduces to conformity in which people merely shift their views in
Page 11 of 26

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

Process Versus Outcome Accountability

accord with those of their evaluators (Tetlock 1983; Tetlock et al. 1989). Moreover,
conformity confers political cover, regardless of whether the chosen processes yield
negative or positive outcomes (Feldman and March 1981). When negative outcomes flow
from deficient

(p. 79)

processes, the defense is that everything was done “by the

book” (“my hands were tied”) or that the use of procedures was a sign of one’s
commitment to the institution (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Scott 2008).
Agency theories in micro-economics also highlight the potential pitfalls of outcome
accountability (Eisenhardt 1989). Outcome-based contracting transfers risk to the agent,
which can be problematic when outcomes are only partly a function of the agents’
behaviors and can be affected by exogenous factors—and the agent is rewarded or
penalized for outcomes partly outside his or her control (Demski and Feltham 1978;
Harris and Raviv 1979; Shavell 1979). Agents may then resort to various forms of cornercutting and shirking (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2002). Again, the conclusion is similar:
outcome accountability can reduce attention to “how” questions, which means that, even
if outcome accountability stimulates innovation, it will be hard to reproduce the success
as long as the inattention to process prevents us from learning which processes should be
replaced and which implemented to increase overall effectiveness (Douglas and Judge
2001).
The result is a design dilemma: implement process accountability to minimize variance in
decision-making and increase reliability (ensuring some control over how decisions are
made), but run the risk of prolonged reliance on deficient practices with little regard for
outcomes, or implement outcome accountability to encourage attention to actual
outcomes (ensuring some innovation and flexibility), but run the risk of encouraging
gaming of poorly understood metrics.
The best path forward would appear to be some form of compromise—movement toward
various hybrid systems that blend features of process and outcome accountability as
appropriate to each new context. Indeed, many hybrids of process and outcome
accountability do exist—such as RAROC (risk-adjusted return on capital) guidelines that
place constraints on the risks that investment decision makers are allowed to make to
mitigate excessive risk-taking, but also incentivize maximizing returns within those
guidelines (Tetlock and Mellers 2011b).
Unfortunately, designing viable hybrid models is easier said than done. Hybrid models
often go astray—bringing out the worst rather than the best consequences of process and
outcome accountability. For example, consistent with work on social dilemmas (Komorita
and Barth 1985) and on goal conflict (Locke, Smith, Erez, Chah, and Schaffer 1994),
research on hybrid individual vs. collective rewards in teamwork shows that members
cope with contradictory pressures to maximize personal vs. group interests by
concentrating on one goal (at the expense of the other), thus undermining performance
(Quigley, Tesluk, Locke, and Bortol 2007; Sniezek, May, and Sawyer 1990; Wageman
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1995). Competing goals also have the potential to produce “analysis-paralysis” (Ethiraj
and Levinthal 2009).
Some trade-offs are inevitable here but we suspect that the hypothesized adverse effects
of both process and outcome accountability can often be contained by designing
accountability systems that “empower” agents. Specifically, agents who feel empowered
under process accountability are likely to resist conformity to deficient standard practices
as well as attend to outcomes whereas those who feel empowered under outcome
accountability are likely to attend to processes as well as outcomes, thereby facilitating
organizational learning.
(p. 80)

The key to “empowering” agents lies in the micro details of the symbolic

interactions between principals and agents—and the meanings that participants assign to
their relationships within the accountability system. Principals are concerned with
establishing the legitimacy of their authority and agents with evaluating the legitimacy of
that authority. Given that principals cannot always monitor agents, it is in their best
interests to communicate to agents that they are legitimate and fair, in order to
encourage norm internalization (Tyler 1997). And given that agents who enter authority
relationships are vulnerable to both exploitation (with attendant loss of outcomes) and
exclusion (with attendant loss of social identity) (Lind 2001), it is in their best interests to
be sensitive to the micro-signals that authorities intentionally or unintentionally
communicate about how they see the agents and why they feel the agents need to be held
accountable in certain ways rather than others.

Factors that Empower Agents through Process and Outcome
Accountability
Psychological empowerment is theoretically an additive function of four factors that
reflect an individual’s active (as opposed to passive) orientation to his or her work:
meaning, competence, self-determination, and impact (Spreitzer 1995; 1996). According
to Spreitzer, meaning involves the fit between the requirements of a person’s work role
and his or her beliefs and values (Hackman and Oldham 1980), competence refers to
confidence in one’s capability to perform work activities (Wood and Bandura 1989), selfdetermination involves a sense of personal control and autonomy in initiating and
directing one’s actions (Deci, Connell, and Ryan 1989), and impact is the degree to which
a person can influence key organizational outcomes and beneficiaries (Ashforth 1989).
These four factors of empowerment have been shown to increase innovation and initiative
(Spreitzer 1995).
This analysis meshes with our concern for balancing control and innovation through
process and outcome accountability. To reiterate, our goal is to explain how relational
factors can compensate for the deficiencies in each accountability system—that is,
prevent continued conformity to inadequate decision practices under process
accountability and prevent codification of processes under outcome accountability. In
Page 13 of 26

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

Process Versus Outcome Accountability

explicit conditions of process accountability, empowerment is hypothesized to induce an
implicit sense of outcome accountability; conversely, in explicit conditions of outcome
accountability, empowerment is hypothesized to induce an implicit sense of process
accountability.

Meaning and Impact
To empower agents via process accountability, agents need to see the system as providing
meaningful opportunities to improve the welfare of others by adopting sound

(p. 81)

practices that yield better decisions (Hackman and Oldham 1976). Agents then feel their
own actions will make a difference for others, increasing the sense of having a prosocial
impact (Grant 2007; Grant et al. 2007). A loss in meaning and sense of impact can cause
an agent simply to conform to inadequate processes as the only end in sight. This may be
especially likely when a decision maker perceives that he or she is being held accountable
for processes only as a means for an organization to meet external regulatory demands or
as a way to keep order.
Principals can increase the meaning of the accountability system and the agent’s
perceived impact by communicating cues that induce a psychological connection between
the decision processes he or she must justify and end-state goals involving the well-being
of identifiable beneficiaries—for example, standard medical procedures are linked to
benefitting patients, decision criteria for making intelligence forecasts are linked to
benefitting national security, procedures for air traffic control are linked to passenger
safety. Research demonstrates that perceptions of task significance can be enhanced by
frequently communicating how jobs can make a difference to the lives of others (Grant
2008), suggesting that continuous messaging about how decision processes enhance the
welfare of beneficiaries can imbue otherwise arbitrary rules with significance.
By contrast, outcome accountability already focuses agents on end-state outcomes so the
challenge is instilling a sense of meaning and impact around the importance of “process”
for long-term organizational effectiveness. Inattention to decision processes under
outcome accountability is exacerbated when decision makers find little or no meaning in
the decision processes themselves. However such inattention can be curbed when agents
see the processes as benefitting the organization, in essence, creating a mental link
between process and outcome.

Self-Determination and Competence
Accountability and self-determination may seem inherently at odds, but theories of
organizational justice suggest otherwise. When principals act in a procedurally fair
manner towards agents, agents may experience substantial autonomy even though
embedded in a complex accountability system of normative constraints.
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Process accountability can enhance procedural justice when principals adopt more
egalitarian-adversarial (as opposed to hierarchical-inquisitorial) approaches to resolving
disputes over who should be responsible for what. Adversarial models stress the
importance of “voice,” of convincing all parties that they have equal opportunities to
present their perspectives. People tend to believe that after an authority has provided
opportunities for “voice” by soliciting their opinions, those opinions will be taken into
consideration when determining the distribution of outcomes (Avery and Quiñones 2002;
Greenberg 2000; Tyler 1987). Given this well-established empirical result, the
opportunity for “voice” inherent in more adversarial models of justice should provide
agents with a sense of autonomy in determining which procedures to adopt in

(p. 82)

decision-making, as they will have the chance to defend their actions to a receptive
audience. This sense of self-determination can give decision makers the confidence
necessary to abandon inadequate decision practices in favor of more effective ones
because they believe their accounts will be given a fair hearing.
Self-determination and autonomy can also be enhanced under outcome accountability
when principals adopt more egalitarian-adversarial approaches to managing agents. The
opportunity for “voice” may provide agents with a sense of freedom to deviate from
optimizing outcomes when doing so would require processes that violate other
organizational norms and values. This greater sense of freedom is rooted in the sense
that they will have an opportunity to explain the reasons behind their deviations—and
their accounts will be taken seriously.
Principals can also instill a sense of competence in agents by conveying respect when
implementing process and outcome accountability systems. Giving respect signals that
agents are valued, high status members in the organization (Tyler and Smith 1997; 1998;
Tyler, Degoey, and Smith 1996), increasing the self-efficacy they feel in conducting their
tasks and coping with accountability demands. Respect can be signaled through process
accountability by emphasizing that the organization sees employee potential in providing
feedback for quality improvement initiatives, and that the organization encourages
employees to monitor which processes do or do not lead to desired outcomes (thereby
signaling employee competence in making meaningful contributions). Respect can be
signaled through outcome accountability by emphasizing that the organization is
confident in the skills and ingenuity of employees to obtain outcomes and that it is
decreasing the monitoring of processes so as to allow for autonomy and flexibility.
Perceptions of competence enhanced through respect have the potential to encourage
agents to abandon deficient standard practices. Some scholars have argued that respect
makes the individual characteristics of the receiver salient (Blader and Tyler 2009; Smith
and Tyler 1997), suggesting that respected people are more likely to “stand up” by
engaging in riskier behavior such as dissent (Grant and Patil 2012; Packer 2008). Possible
explanations include: (a) higher status increases perceptions that dissent will lead to
rewards (Hirschman 1970; Sherif and Sherif 1967); (b) higher status decreases the threat
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of penalties for dissent (Hollander 1958; Kelley and Shapiro 1954; Phillips and Zuckerman
2001).
Respect, by increasing feelings of competence, can also encourage attention to “how one
thinks” and decrease reliance on intuition (incommunicable private knowledge) under
outcome accountability. Respect from organizational authorities has been linked to
increased social identification (Simon and Stürmer 2003; Spears, Ellemers, Doosje, and
Branscombe 2006), in which employees feel part of the group (Tajfel and Turner 1986)
and work toward achieving organizational goals (Tyler and Blader 2000). These findings
suggest that employees who feel respected and competent under outcome accountability
are more likely to attend to decision processes if they believe doing so will promote
organizational goals of control.

(p. 83)

Concluding Remarks

Accountability is often defined as the answer to the question “who must answer to whom,
for what, under whose ground rules?” (Tetlock 1985). Our analysis adds the “why?”
question: “why do people believe they are accountable?” It matters whether people think
the answer is “because we lack confidence in your integrity or competence” or “because
we want to help you achieve objectives we all share.” Exploring the social-identity signals
conveyed by different types of accountability can help us achieve a deeper understanding
of the complicated patchwork quilt of laboratory results on accountability and the often
acrimonious debates that arise in the real world over how best to design accountability
systems. And understanding the messages that their accountability systems send to
employees can help managers cope more effectively with the classic trade-off between
control and innovation. Although the trade-off will never disappear, managers should be
able to push out the Pareto frontier for trade-offs between control and innovation and get
more of the best of both worlds, to the degree they design accountability systems that
send “empowering” messages to employees, messages of the form: the work we do
together is meaningful; we value your contributions to the collective effort; we take your
point of view seriously; and we plan to continue working together to achieve shared goals
in a mutually respectful fashion.
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